Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 48

Issue 3

Article

2000

Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How Arbitrators Decide
Mollie H. Bowers
Merrick School of Business, University of Baltimore, and Franklin P. Perdue School of Business, Salisbury
State University.

E. Patrick McDermott

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Mollie H. Bowers and E. Patrick McDermott, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How Arbitrators Decide
, 48 Clev. St. L. Rev. 439 (2000)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: HOW
ARBITRATORS DECIDE
MOLLIE H. BOWERS1
E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT2

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 440
II. CASE LAW ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT ................................. 440
III. MODEL OF ARBITRAL DECISION-MAKING
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES ......................................... 442
A. Published Policy .......................................................... 444
B. Investigation of Allegation........................................... 446
1. Due Process Rights............................................... 449
2. Burden of Proof .................................................... 451
3. Proof of Conduct .................................................. 451
C. Totality of Record ........................................................ 455
D. Other Pertinent Considerations................................... 458
1. Off Duty/Off Premises Conduct ........................... 458
2. Estoppel ................................................................ 460
3. Societal Perceptions.............................................. 460
E. Advice to Advocates ..................................................... 463
1. Selection of the Arbitrator .................................... 463
2. Opening Statement ............................................... 464
3. Arguing External Law .......................................... 464
4. Advantages of Remorse and
of Telling the Truth .............................................. 465
5. Do Not Testify if the Employer
Fails to Provide Live Witness
Testimony (i.e., Don’t Fight Ghosts).................... 465

1

Mollie H. Bowers, Ph.D., NAA, is an internationally recognized labor arbitrator and
mediator, and is a past president of SPIDR. Dr. Bowers has published numerous articles on
dispute resolution and human resource management. She is also a Professor in the Merrick
School of Business, University of Baltimore, where her teaching concentrations are in
Negotiations and Conflict Management, Arbitration, and Human Resource Management.
2
Patrick McDermott, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of management at the Franklin P.
Perdue School of Business, Salisbury State University. He taught previously Hood College.
Prior to receiving his Ph.D., Dr. McDermott served as a labor relations counsel in the airline,
media and Walt Disney industries.

The authors thank W. Sue Reddick for her significant contributions to production of this
article, and Robert Fronzcak and Lawrence Simpson for their research efforts.

439

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000

1

440

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

6.
7.

[Vol. 48:439

Effective Use of Requests for Information........... 466
Keep Your Witnesses on the Team ...................... 467
I. INTRODUCTION

For thirty years courts and labor arbitrators have grappled with what constitutes
sexual harassment and how to remedy such behavior. The Federal judiciary has
developed case law on sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. However, arbitrators addressing this issue under collective bargaining
agreements have often treated similar fact patterns differently than jurists. A key
reason for this difference is that litigation is essentially a zero sum game, the
respondent is either guilty or not guilty. In contrast, labor arbitrators decide
culpability first, and then consider the appropriate remedy. Regardless of whether an
arbitrator elects to apply external law, he considers broader concepts of industrial
jurisprudence in determining what the remedy shall be. This seems to create a chasm
between arbitral treatment of sexual harassment allegations and that of Federal courts
under Title VII.
In reconciling these separate paths for establishing standards of workplace
conduct, the authors will provide a model that explains how arbitrators decide sexual
harassment cases and how this model dovetails with the case law developed by the
Supreme Court since 1986.
This analysis is intended to be useful to advocates in sexual harassment cases
brought under a collective bargaining agreement, as well as to arbitrators and
academicians. Guidance is provided for a variety of considerations such as selection
of an arbitrator, framing the issue, effective use of requests for information, and
much more.
II. CASE LAW ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 703(a) of Title VII makes it illegal for,
An employer (1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s … sex.3
The terms quid pro quo and ‘hostile work environment’ do not appear in the
statute. These terms first appeared in academic literature, found their way into
decisions of the courts of appeal, and were mentioned for the first time by the
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 4 The Court indicated that the use
of the terms quid pro quo and hostile environment is helpful to the extent that they
illustrate the distinction between cases where a threat is carried out and cases where
offensive conduct, generally, is proven.
The concept of quid pro quo has been relatively clear from the outset. Defining
under Title VII what conduct creates a hostile work environment has proven to be

3

42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (2001).

4

Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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more elusive.5 In the Meritor decision, the Supreme Court set forth tests to
determine whether the conduct complained of produces a hostile environment. The
Court held, “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusing
working environment.”6 These are stringent tests, as demonstrated in the Paula Jones
case.7
The Meritor decision was clarified by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift
Systems Inc.8 The Court again addressed the definition of a hostile work
environment stating, “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’
Title VII is violated.”9 This reinforced the stringency of the test for hostile work
environment and gave some guidance for decision-making.
In the two most recent sexual harassment cases decided by the Supreme Court,
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,10 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,11 the
Court continued to discuss what conduct constitutes both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment. In Burlington Industries, the Court held that
if an employer demanded sexual favors from an employee in return for a
job benefit, discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of
employment was explicit. Less obvious was whether an employer’s
sexually demeaning behavior altered terms or conditions of employment
in violation of Title VII.12
The Court also reiterated that a hostile environment claim required a showing of
“severe or pervasive” conduct”, citing its earlier decisions in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.,13 and in Harris.14 The Faragher decision addressed
5

See Stephen M. Crow & Clifford M. Koen, Sexual Harassment: New Challenges for
Labor Arbitrators, ARB. J., June, 1992, at 6-18, wherein it is noted that “the definition of
sexual harassment may remain unresolved for several years.”
6
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897,
904 (CA 11 1982); see also, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998).
(Emphasis added)
7

Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).

8

Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).

9

Id. at 21.

10

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).

11

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

12

Burlington Indus., 414 U.S. at 752.

13

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Until Oncale, the
primary focus of both judicial and arbitral decision-making in sexual harassment cases was on
women victims in supervisor-subordinate, co-worker, and client-employee relationships. This
changed with Oncale, which held that Title VII also covered same sex sexual harassment.
14

414 U.S. at 754. The Court in Burlington Indus. went out of its way to state that it
expressed no opinion about whether “a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment.”
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standards established earlier by the Court, noting that they were sufficiently
demanding to ensure that Title VII did not become a general civility code.15
While case law on hostile work environment was developed by the Supreme
Court in the 1980’s and 1990’s, various Federal district courts and courts of appeal
separately came to their own conclusions about what constituted severe or pervasive
conduct that altered the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment. This
meant that courts provided different results on similar fact patterns. Thus, the
determination of what constituted a hostile environment has been at least a twodecade long “work in progress.”
III. MODEL OF ARBITRAL DECISION-MAKING IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
Under a collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator’s mandate is to determine
whether the employer had just cause for the discipline imposed; not whether the
complainant’s legal rights had been violated. As in any just cause case, an arbitrator
must decide, based on evidence and testimony, whether the employer proved the
alleged conduct took place, and if proven, whether the penalty fits the offense and
what the remedy shall be. This would seem to imply that arbitrators are precluded
from considering external law in making decisions.
Some years ago, the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) engaged in
extended, sometimes heated, discussion on this topic. For most NAA arbitrators, and
perhaps other arbitrators, that debate may now be moot. The text of arbitral
decisions clearly reflects arbitrator recognition that external law and the content of
collective bargaining agreements are parallel paths for resolution of workplace
disputes. No workplace issue shows the influence of external law on arbitral
decision-making as clearly as sexual harassment.
Analysis of arbitral sexual harassment cases published in the last five years in
Labor Arbitration Reports16 and in Labor Arbitration Awards17 showed that the
preponderance of such cases involved, as in court cases, an allegation of hostile work
environment. The published awards show some interesting dichotomies in how
arbitrators view the relationship between conduct and the appropriate penalty. For
example, awards reveal the following offense-penalty pattern:18
Offense:
Penalty:
Obscene
Discharge
Vulgar
Suspension
Foreplay
Unforgivable
Horseplay
Forgivable
Touching
Discharge
Verbal/Visual Abuse
Suspension
It can be argued that these arbitral dichotomies are consistent with the way
Federal courts define what constitutes severe or pervasive conduct that alters the
terms and conditions of another person’s employment. Where arbitrators encounter
15

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.

16

The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (Washington, D.C.).

17

Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (Chicago, Illinois).

18

ANITA CHRISTINE KNOWLTON, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
THE SEXUAL HARASSER: WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY?
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conduct that they consider either severe or pervasive, the tendency appears to be to
uphold the employer discipline, including termination. Conversely, where less
offensive conduct occurred; for example, sexual harassment that would not be
considered severe or pervasive under Federal law, arbitrators appear to review more
closely the array of procedural issues that may arise in just cause cases. This
approach establishes a two-tier process of arbitral decision-making that parallels
court determinations of whether a severe or pervasive hostile environment sufficient
to prove illegal conduct under Title VII exists.19 The threshold determination is the
severity and/or pervasiveness of the conduct at issue.
For the purpose of this discussion we will refer to those cases where arbitrators
find either quid pro quo or severe or pervasive conduct, and is so offensive as to alter
a victim’s terms and conditions of employment, as Type I cases. Type II will refer to
those cases that involve only charges relating to creation of a hostile work
involvement.
Our analysis shows that in Type I cases, as in serious workplace violence, theft,
or other major transgressions, arbitrators tend not to engage in deep analysis of
contextual factors and procedural issues where an employer proves a serious
transgression has occurred. Instead, arbitrators generally deal with such severe or
pervasive sexual harassment as a zero-sum process, if the allegation is proven the
penalty is upheld.
Our analysis of the Type II cases shows that arbitrators seem to address cases
involving an allegation(s) of creating a hostile work environment in the same or a
similar manner to that which they use in addressing just cause for discipline or
discharge in other cases. In fact, the arbitral decision-making in such cases appears
to follow the “Seven Tests of Just Cause” enunciated by Arbitrator Carroll
Daugherty in 1966.20 The “seven tests” Daugherty found applicable to just cause
issues are:
Test 1. Did the company give the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the
possible or probable disciplinary consequences of the employee’s conduct?
Test 2. Was the company’s rule or managerial order reasonably related to (a) the
orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the company’s business and (b) the
performance that the company might properly expect of the employee.
Test 3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an employee, make
an effort to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or an
order of management?
Test 4. Was the company’s investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
Test 5. At the investigation did the “judge” obtain substantial evidence or proof
that the employee was guilty as charged?
Test 6. Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly
and without discrimination to all employees?

19
This model is similar to that set forth by arbitrator Whitley P. McCoy and discussed in
EDNA ELKOURI & FRANK ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 670-71 (4th ed., 1985); McCoy
proposes that there are two general classes of offenses, serious offenses where no progressive
discipline is required and less serious infractions where progressive discipline is appropriate.
20

Enterprise Wire Co. v. Enterprise Indep. Union, 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 359 (1966)
(Daugherty, Arb.).
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Test 7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a particular
case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee’s proven offense and
(b) the record of the employee in his service with the company.
The authors are aware that members of the National Academy of Arbitrators have
debated, verbally and in print, the seven tests. It is not the purpose here to engage in
that debate, but rather to explore how arbitrators have reached conclusions in sexual
harassment cases.
Based upon our analysis, we have found, enunciated or not, that arbitrators who
decide sexual harassment cases, apply, advertently or inadvertently, the ‘seven tests’,
especially in Type II cases. We also found that arbitrators may rely upon external
law in either a Type I or a Type II case. The results of this analysis, with
illustrations of both types of cases, follow.21 Section A, Published Policy, addresses
issues raised in Daugherty’s Tests 1 and 2. Section B, Investigation of Allegations,
addresses Tests 3, 4, and 5 and the issues of full investigation, proof of conduct, and
burden of proof. Section C, Totality of the Record, addresses Tests 6 and 7 and the
issues of repeat offenses, disparate treatment, past practice, and mitigation. The
issues addressed in Section D, Other, while not directly related to the ‘Seven Tests’,
are issues that are routinely considered by arbitrators in just cause cases. These
issues are off duty/off premises conduct, estoppel, and societal perceptions.
A. Published Policy
Arbitrators consider a published policy on sexual harassment to be a work rule
that is reasonably promulgated by the employer. There are occasions, however,
when a provision of such policy may be questioned as affecting the due process
rights of either the victim or the accused. These will be explored in Section B. Even
in the absence of a published policy, arbitrators are tending to view the prohibition
against quid pro quo sexual harassment as ‘common sense’, holding that a proven
harasser ‘knew or should have known’ the behavior was inappropriate.
For example, in American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees
Local 473 v. Chief Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Court,22 the arbitrator addressed
the situation of a grievant who was suspended for repeatedly making comments of a
sexual nature to a female court reporter. The arbitrator noted, “[t]he grievant in this
case is a sophisticated, intelligent, articulate man. Even without an explicit rule, he
should have known that his leering comments to a co-worker and his attempts to
corner and kiss her were inappropriate workplace behavior.”23 This case is classified
as a Type I case because the repeated, improper comments, which could arguably
support a finding of hostile work environment under Title VII, resulted in the
arbitrator ignoring the fact that there was no rule prohibiting this conduct.
A second example of a Type I case is Stark County Sheriff and Fraternal Order
of Police Ohio Labor Council, Inc.24 This case involved a male correctional officer

21

Citations for additional illustrative cases are listed as Endnotes.

22

American Fed. of State, County and Mun. Employees Local 473 v. Chief Judge of the
Seventeenth Judicial Court, 94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3597 (1993) (Nathan, Arb.).
23

Id. at 3603.

24

Stark County Sheriff v. Fraternal Order of Police Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 105 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 304 (1995) (Heekin, Arb.).
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who was discharged for threats, coercion, intimidation, and sexual harassment of
fellow employees, including grabbing the crotch of a female officer. The arbitrator
ruled that the correctional officer could be disciplined, despite the lack of a sexual
harassment policy, because “the unacceptability of such extreme misconduct towards
fellow employees, involving sexual terms which are commonly understood and to be
so off-color as to make a joking context very implausible, precludes the necessity of
a sexual harassment policy or specific prior notice in this case.”25
Where Type II cases are concerned it appears that arbitral decision-making can
be shaped by many factors, and is often unpredictable. Type II cases illustrate that
there can be a ‘difference with distinction’ between the way arbitrators perceive, and
seem to view, the distinction between Type I and Type II cases. Illustrative of this is
Prudential Life Insurance Company of America v. United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union.26 In this case the insurance company issued a male
agent a written letter of warning, stating that he violated the company’s policy on
sexual harassment. On the days that he was required to report to the office, the agent
had a habit of waiting in the parking lot for a particular female office worker, then
walking her into the office, often making comments about her appearance, the way
she walked, and the way she dressed. One morning, the agent also asked that the
employee go dancing with him instead of going to work. The woman was married
and was worried about how her husband would react if he found out about the
grievant’s conduct. She reported the agent’s conduct to her manager, and the
company decided subsequently to issue a disciplinary letter to the agent. The
arbitrator concluded that the letter of warning sought to impose a higher standard of
conduct than that established by Title VII. According to the arbitrator, the problem
with the letter was that the policy relied upon was not clear as to whether it
incorporated the Title VII standard or, in fact, set a higher standard of conduct. In so
ruling, the arbitrator noted that while the company had the right to set a higher
standard, it must provide notice of the rule so that any employee ‘knew or should
have known’ the disciplinary consequences of his action. The arbitrator also
reasoned that the discipline would stigmatize the employees, and that arbitrators
apply additional scrutiny to such consequences. He ordered the company to rescind
the warning letter stating, “Employers are not justified in taking disciplinary action
against employees who do not know, or could not have reasonably known, at the
time of their actions of the possible disciplinary consequences of such actions.”27
In another Type II case, American Protective Service, Inc. v. American
Federation of Guards Local 1,28 a female employee was discharged for sending a
series of graphic love letters to a male supervisor at work. The grievant’s knowledge
of the company policy and her admission to sending the letters were important
factors relied upon by the arbitrator in upholding her discharge, even though there
was no physical touching or other more aggravated types of sexual harassment.

25

Id.

26

Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union,
94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3417 (1993) (Heinsz, Arb.).
27

Id. at 3422.

28

American Protective Serv., Inc. v. American Fed’n of Guards Local 1, 94-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) (1994) (Gentile, Arb.).
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Other factors, which militated against the grievant, were that she was a short-term
employee (a little over 5 months), some of the conduct complained of occurred while
she was in a probationary status, and she had filed a complaint under the harassment
policy. It is important to note that in some harassment cases poor management, a
union’s legal duty and/or lack of leadership can cause a case to rise to the arbitration
level which ‘should,’ and but for these, have been resolved at a lower level in the
grievance procedure.
City of Key West v. Individual Grievant,29 provides yet another approach to Type
II cases regarding published policy. A police captain with sixteen year’s experience
was suspended for twenty days and demoted for harassing and otherwise improper
comments to a female officer. These comments included telling a female officer that
“you should have an abortion,” in response to her request for a Christmas Eve leave
to spend time with her children, and to “bring in knee pads,” pursuant to the officer’s
request for specific days off to further her education.30 With respect to the Captain’s
first comment, the arbitrator held “Said behavior was conduct which unreasonably
interfered with and created an intimidating, hostile, offensive working environment”
for the victim.”31 While acknowledging that the “knee Pads,” comment was
“improper” and “humiliating,” the arbitrator held that just cause was lacking to
discipline the grievant under City policy because “Said statement was not one which
constituted sexual harassment. It was not utilized in a manner that was
demonstrative of or in connection with employment or employment advances based
or connected with sex or sexual harassment.”32 A conclusion that could be drawn
from this case, and others cited, is that male arbitrators, who clearly dominate the
profession and, thus, hear the preponderance of cases, have a major influence in
determining whether they view a case as Type I or Type II; regardless of the facts.
Another interesting aspect of Type II cases is revealed in the complex fact pattern
of the case involving T.J. Max v. Union of Needletrades.33 This case involved, inter
alia, a claim of sexual harassment. One of the charges against a male employee was
gross misconduct for making offensive comments to female employees, even though
the affected employees disregarded the comments. The arbitrator found the
grievant’s conduct was gross or coarse but, under the employer’s policy, his behavior
did not rise to the level of sexual harassment―unreasonable inference with the
individual’s job performance or the creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive
work environment - because the behavior was disregarded by the women.
B. Investigation of Allegation
Incidents of alleged sexual harassment are replete with elements that can
adversely affect an investigation and, thus, the due process rights of the grievant.
Among the more obvious, victims may be reluctant to report offensive behavior at
all, much less in a timely fashion believing, among other things, they can handle the
29

City of Key West v. Individual Grievant, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 651 (1996) (Wolfson,
Arb.).
30

Id. at 653.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

T.J. Max v. Union of Needletrades, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 78 (1996) (Richman, Arb.).
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conduct on their own. Peer, and other types of pressure, may prevent witnesses from
coming forward or encourage them to embellish their accounts of the incident.
Perception may play a large role in how the behavior is interpreted. The accused
may be viewed as ‘guilty’ until proven innocent. Any one of these elements, and a
host of other similar issues, increase the risk that reversible error will be found or the
penalty will be reduced.
A complex example of a Type I case that addresses the issue of the company’s
investigation is found in Quaker Oats Company v. Retail Wholesale & Department
Store Union Local 110.34 In this case, a male employee was discharged for allegedly
sexually harassing a female co-worker by grabbing her breasts on several occasions
and her buttocks on one occasion. The union’s defense included a claim that the
employer’s investigation was “insufficient.”35 The arbitrator upheld the discharge
finding, inter alia, that the employer “interviewed all of the people who regularly
worked on the same line with Ms. [C] and the grievant. The few it did not talk to
were people who were on the line for only a part of the time that [C] claimed she was
harassed.”36 He further held that “an investigation cannot be condemned merely
because it did not include inquiry into every possible lead or a meeting with
everyone who might have a shred of evidence that was relevant. The Company’s
inquiry, while short of perfect, was adequate under the circumstances.”37
This conclusion was buttressed by the Arbitrator’s conclusions on the sufficiency
of evidence supplied by the employer. The evidence noted by the arbitrator
included: (a) credible, corroborating testimony of [E], a female employee of an
independent contractor, who did not know and had not conferred with the
complainant, but had been discouraged from complaining about the grievant’s
behavior by her supervisor, (b) the independent testimony of both the complainant
and the corroborating witness [E] that neither of them complained to the employer
“because they did not want the Grievant to lose his job; they only wanted to be left
alone,” and (c) the testimony of the complainant that she was afraid to complain to
“management because she had struck the Grievant and used vulgar language toward
him, and she thought she might be punished for her behavior.”38 The male arbitrator
concluded that, “Their behavior is reminiscent of Anita Hill and is equally confusing
to a male such as the Arbitrator, however, it is not the behavior of a woman who had
decided to invent a story about the Grievant to get him fired.”39 A back door
rationalization for the decision, despite the Arbitrator’s findings, was completed in
his notice that the complainant’s and [E]’s testimony was supported by “the report
from a fellow employee who was not called as a witness at the arbitration hearing

34

Quaker Oats Co. v. Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 110, 95-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 3188 (1993) (Bernstein, Arb.).
35

Id. at 3191.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

95-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) at 3192.
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that the Grievant had stated [to] that she preferred grabbing [C]’s breasts to those of
[E].”40
Certain cases fall clearly in the Type II category. In some Type II cases
employers have shown a tendency to accept the statements of the accuser, standing
alone, as ‘proof’ that the harassment occurred. In District of Columbia Public
Schools v. Washington, D.C. Teachers Union,41 a teacher was terminated for alleged
sexual harassment of a student. Only the accuser and three witnesses, all identified
by the accuser, out of a class of nearly thirty witnesses, were interviewed during the
investigation. Those witnesses could not corroborate the accuser’s allegations and
she, in the Arbitrator’s view, had an “adolescent’s view” of what constituted
harassment (i.e., felt “uncomfortable”). The Arbitrator noted that, “… the Grievant
is not without rights. It is one function of arbitration and the duty of the Arbitrator to
ensure that he [the Grievant] has been afforded the right of due process, and has been
treated in conformity with the Law and the Labor Contract…”42
The arbitrator also wrestled with the meaning of the charge itself, stating,
[p]art of the problem here is the nature of the charge itself―sexual
harassment. The definition has evolved considerably over the past ten
years, and it has received more public attention and commentary than
most other charges. To some individuals, including certain officials
involved in this case, it is an offense that has no degrees of seriousness—
every sort of sexual harassment is equally heinous. This Arbitrator
disagrees with that position.43
Utilizing a Type II approach, the Arbitrator then found that, as with other standards
of conduct, there are “major” and “minor” offenses of sexual harassment. The facts
of this case caused the Arbitrator to find that the teacher had engaged in
inappropriate behavior, but that the proper discipline was not termination. The
penalty was reduced to a suspension for the school year in which the conduct
occurred.
The potential notoriety and liability associated with a claim of sexual harassment
may be so anxiety producing that an employer rushes to judgment, believing she/he
“already knows” the accused is capable of the alleged conduct. These are not
reasons for disciplining a grievant before the investigation commences. Beliefs
about the validity of a complaint should not be basis for determining, a priori, that an
investigation is unwarranted.
Another permutation of the due process trap is to immediately credit the accused
and not the accuser. In a Type II case, a captain who was a seventeen year veteran of
the police force, with an excellent record, was suspended for ten days because he did
not report a clerk’s sexual harassment complaint against a lieutenant because he
believed the clerk was a disgruntled employee and discounted the complaint. The
Department had a clear rule requiring that the complaint be reported to internal
40

Id.

41

District of Columbia Pub. Sch. v. Washington, D.C. Teachers Union, 105 La. Arb.
(BNA) 1037 (1995) (Johnson, Arb.)
42

Id. at 1039.

43

Id.
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affairs. Additionally, the grievant chose, in violation of another policy and “common
sense,” “to identify the accuser to the alleged perpetrator” which “only served to
pour fuel on the fire.”44 The Arbitrator upheld the suspension, but reduced it to four
days based on the grievant’s tenure, work record, and the initial decision at the
divisional level.45
Due process considerations and timeliness of the complaint were facts in the
Type II case of Avis Rent A Car Shuttlers v. Teamsters Local 355,46 A male lead
driver was alleged to have sexually harassed a female co-worker by making lewd
remarks, suggestive comments, and by touching her. The victim delayed
considerably in reporting the conduct because she said she thought she could handle
it own her own. When the complaint was received, the grievant was suspended and
then demoted permanently. However, the company did not ask the grievant for his
version and it refused his request for a copy of the charges made against him. The
grievant did stop the conduct at issue when he was notified by management that his
conduct was considered to be sexual harassment.
The arbitrator upheld the grievance, finding that the company did not conduct a
proper investigation. He relied heavily on the contract, citing a provision requiring
the company to give at least one prior warning in writing before a discharge or
suspension is meted out. The suspension was set aside by construing the contract
language as providing a guarantee of “due process,” including the opportunity to be
aware of the charges and to defend oneself before discipline is imposed. The
permanent demotion was deemed to be excessive and was reduced to a demotion up
and to the date of the issuance of the arbitrator’s award.
In a like case, Firestone Rubber and Latex Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union Local 4-836,47 a male employee was discharged for
verbally abusing female and other co-workers. The arbitrator applied the “seven
tests” in concluding that the discharge was without just cause because the company
did not conduct a fair and objective investigation because no effort was made to
obtain the grievant’s response to the allegations and because no effort was made to
consider problems that prompted the employee complaints, the veracity of such
complaints, or verification from the accused that the grievant actually committed the
actions complained of.
1. Due Process Rights
Arbitrators pay close attention to the due process rights of the grievant and the
victim in both Type I and Type II cases. ABTCO, Inc. v. International Woodworkers
Local III-260,48 is a Type I case which illustrates this point. A union steward
44

City of Houston v. Houston Police Officers Union, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1070, 1075
(1996) (Sherman, Arb.).
45

Id. at 1076.

46

Avis Rent A Car Shuttlers v. Teamsters Local 355, 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1057 (1995)
(Wahl, Arb.).
47
Firestone Rubber and Latex Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int’l Union Local
4-836, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 276 (1996) (Koenig, Arb.).
48

ABTCO, Inc. v. International Woodworkers Local III-260, 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 551
(1995) (Kanner, Arb.).
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attempted to settle a female employee’s complaint of sexual harassment to prevent
discipline of her harasser who was a fellow bargaining unit member. The company
learned independently of the harassment and discharged the harasser, who was
subject to a “Last Chance Agreement” due to earlier insubordinate and dishonest
conduct. The union charged management with interfering in internal union business.
The arbitrator disagreed, upholding the termination. He stated that once the
company learned of the possible violation of the sexual harassment policy, it had an
absolute right to act to enforce the policy and protect the due process rights of the
victim. Failure to do so could subject the company to unwarranted liability from suit
by the female employee.
The arbitrator also addressed the grievant’s claim that he was unaware of the
company’s sexual harassment policy and did not know that pinching the female coworker on the buttocks constituted a violation thereof, stating “I am of the view that
a notice proscribing sexual harassment need not be published or posted by the
employer in the first instance. There are certain rules of conduct so well known that
the employees are deemed aware of them. Misconduct such as theft, drinking on the
job, and insubordination, etcetera [sic] need not be codified by written rules and
disseminated to employees.”49
Due process concerns also arise in Type II cases like Renton School District v.
Service Employees International Union Local 6.50 District policy insulated accusers
from identification to the grievant and to the union until the arbitration hearing. A
school custodian was accused of making inappropriate sexual comments to various
teachers and cafeteria aides. The arbitrator employed Daugherty’s just cause
analytical framework, and also integrated the case law of Meritor and Hensen into
her analysis. She ruled that the grievant was guilty of sexual harassment and upheld
his disciplinary demotion. She also found, however, that the district’s refusal to
identify the complaining co-workers or provide the details of the complaint until
arbitration was a denial of due process. Noting there was no harmful error to the
grievant, the arbitrator awarded him backpay to make up for his demotion up to the
date of the arbitration.
Another type of due process concern arises when an accuser refuses to testify.
Arbitrators may elect to draw a negative inference, even if the complainant alleges
fear of physical harm. This negative inference can be drawn against the claim itself,
or may be found in the arbitrator’s review of the penalty. In Metropolitan Council
Transit Operations v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1005,51 the arbitrator found
the grievant guilty as charged, but reduced his suspension from thirty to fifteen days
because the only direct testimony was the grievant’s own admission against interest.
The complainant alleged she was fearful for her life due to reported threats and other
incidents to discourage her involvement in the arbitration. The arbitrator allowed her
affidavit into evidence, but credited only those allegations that were admitted by the
grievant in his testimony to produce a Type II remedy.

49

Id. at 554.

50

Renton Sch. Dist. v. Service Employees Int’l Union Local 6, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 854)
(1994) (Wilkinson, Arb.).
51

Metropolitan Council Transit Operations v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1005,
106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 68 (1996) (Daly, Arb.).
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Double jeopardy has also been addressed in Type II cases. In USAF 82
MSSO/MSCE Base, Sheppard AFB, Texas v. National Federation of Federal
Employees Local,52 a federal agency suspended a training instructor for sexual
harassment eleven months after it had issued him an oral admonishment for the same
offenses. The arbitrator found the agency did not have the right, under any
applicable law, rule, regulation, or the collective bargaining agreement, to cancel the
admonishment and then issue a second disciplinary action. The same principle
applied in All West Container Company v. Graphic Communications Union, District
Council No. 2.53 An employer suspended a male employee for sexual harassment
one year after it had issued him a verbal warning for the same incident. The
arbitrator rescinded the suspension that he considered to be double jeopardy.
2. Burden of Proof
A burden of proof determination is likely to be influenced by the standards of
behavior in the workplace. In less salient cases involving the claim of sexual
harassment, whistles and hoots in the workplace cannot be translated into a bona fide
case of sexual harassment when it is shown that this behavior is displayed to mixed
sex employees on a regular and repetitive basis, and is tolerated, not only by the
employees (many of whom engage in such behavior) but also by the employer. This
is a problem, if recognized by the employer, that needs to be solved by putting
employees and the union on notice that such behavior will not be tolerated, and by
giving a reasonable period to comply.
In Penn Hills, PA School District and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1552,
107 LA 566 (O’Connell), a Type II case, the arbitrator held that the grievant engaged
in annoying behavior and exhibited poor judgment, but was not guilty of sexual
harassment because there was no touching or harassing language. The grievant, a
male bus driver, had been discharged for misconduct with a substitute teacher. He
tried to engage her in conversation, asked her for dates, and even showed up at her
residence uninvited. The arbitrator converted the discharge into a suspension that
included the upcoming Fall semester.
3. Proof of Conduct
Determining whether the offense alleged is proven is an essential part of
investigation. Many sexual harassment cases involve an accuser’s word against that
of her/his alleged harasser, the so-called “he said, she said” incidents. Credibility
determinations are key in shaping an arbitrator’s decision in both Type I and Type II
cases. Motive, corroboration, past incidents of similar conduct, and rational
reasoning are among the factors arbitrators credit in making credibility
determinations.
Vista Chemical Company v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union Local 4-555,54 is a Type I case. A recently assigned eighteen year old female
52

USAF 82 MSSO/MSCE Base, Sheppard AFB, Texas v. National Fed’n of Fed.
Employees Local 799, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1089 (1997) (Stephens, Arb.).
53
All West Container Co. v. Graphic Communications Union, District Council No. 2, 109
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1208 (1997) (Riker, Arb.).
54

Vista Chem. Co. v. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int’l Union Local 4-555, 104 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 818 (1995) (Nicholas, Arb.).
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security guard accused a male employee of sexual harassment by asking personal
questions about her life and her fiancée, asking if she would accept a gift, hugging
her at the guardhouse and continuing to bother her. The grievant had been accused
of sexual harassment by five other female security guards over the three years
preceding these events. The company investigated one of these allegations and,
when the grievant denied any wrongdoing, no further action was taken. The
arbitrator began his work by establishing the standard of proof required for the
company to prevail. He said sexual harassment is a serious allegation to which a
stigma is attached and, thus, the standard of proof that has to be met is “clear and
convincing,” rather than a “preponderance” of the evidence.55 The arbitrator went on
to state,
I am left with the distinct impression that [the accuser] did not fictionalize
the charges she makes against the Grievant. Indeed, I find no motive
whatsoever for [the accuser] to have done so. She hardly knew the
Grievant, and for her to concoct such a story against Grievant does not
come with a logical foundation.56
He then moved easily to the conclusion that “the severest discipline available,
summary discharge” was the appropriate penalty. The arbitrator went on to add, “To
say that sexual harassment is serious misconduct borders on understatement. Given
the development of civil rights law in recent years and the potential for liability
which Company faces from permitting such conduct to go unchecked in its
workplace, I must concur with Company’s position that discharge was the only
reasonable response to Grievant’s actions.”57
Rational reasoning and corroboration were central factors in a Type I case
involving City of Orlando Police Department v. Individual Grievant.58 The
arbitrator applied the ‘clear and convincing’ standard, but acknowledged that
“Impressions of credibility are ephemeral at best, and must reside in the subjective
eye of the beholder.”59 In this case, the accuser made significant admissions against
interest, telling the grievant she loved him.
She admitted she believed a friendship with a superior officer would help
her career and that [grievant] was in a position to further her career. Until
the day in late February when she told [the grievant] she would not leave
her husband, she apparently never once told [him] his attentions were
unwelcome. At that point, I would conclude that [the accuser’s]
complaint of sexual harassment would fail to meet the test set forth in
Henson and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.60

55

Id. at 821.

56

Id. at 822.

57

Id. (emphasis added).

58

City of Orlando Police Dep’t v. Individual Grievant, 109 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1174 (1998)
(Sweeney, Arb.).
59

Id. at 1182.

60

Id.
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In a split decision, the arbitrator did rule in the accuser’s favor where the charges of
hostile work environment are concerned. Factors which contributed to this result
included: controversion of the grievant’s testimony by a superior officer about why
the accuser was subjected to a special evaluation “following an outstanding regular
evaluation by a period of a few weeks;” “sudden and dramatic changes in [the
accuser’s] work environment, her removal from her position as Assistant Squad
Leader;” “[the accuser’s] testimony is detailed, containing content which must have
been personally embarrassing and includes [so many] unlikely instances . . . that I
cannot accept the premise that she invented these incidents in an effort to discredit
her supervisor,” and testimony by another female officer that she had been subjected
to similar offensive conduct by the grievant.61
Hughes Family Markets, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union
Local 770,62 is a classic “he said, she said’ case, where the grievant also had the
advantage of being a long service employee. A Service Manager’s testimony about
the accuser’s nervousness, request to accompany her to her vehicle, and personal
observation of the grievant staring at her were important in establishing the accuser’s
credibility. Additionally, the grievant had received a written warning three years
before “for making sexual comments to a female” employee who no longer worked
for the employer.63 The arbitrator upheld the grievant’s discharge, concluding “The
‘pattern’ aspects of the Grievant’s alleged behavior” adversely affected the accuser
“in her role as a worker.”64
The next two cases illustrate that just cause for discipline exists when it is proven
that an employee has harassed a member of the public. A male train conductor was
discharged in a Type I case involving the Chicago Transit Authority v. Amalgamated
Transit Union Local 308.65 He enticed a female passenger to get into his unoccupied
car at a station and proceeded to expose himself, attempted to fondle her, tried to
remove her clothes, and when the passenger refused to give oral sex, masturbated to
ejaculation. The passenger exited the train at the next stop and reported the
conductor to the police, who arrested him. The conductor initially denied everything
but when ejaculation stains were found on his uniform, the grievant admitted his
behavior to management. The arbitrator found the passenger’s testimony was
credible, whereas the grievant’s was not and he admitted to lying during the
disciplinary investigation, and denied the grievance.
EPA v. American Federation of Government Employees Local 3347,66 is a Type
II case wherein a government agency meted out a three-day suspension to a male
team leader for making inappropriate sexual remarks to a female contractor’s

61

Id.

62

Hughes Family Mkts., Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 770,
97-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3853 (1996) (Grabuskie, Arb.).
63

Id. at 3855.

64

Id. at 3860.

65

Chicago Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 308, 94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 4271 (1994) (Stallworth, Arb.).
66

EPA v. American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 3347, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1046
(Smith, Arb.).
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representative. The grievant denied making some comments and asserted that the
representative took others out of context. The arbitrator denied the grievance, stating
that although this is a ‘he said, she said’ case, the grievant’s testimony was not
credible, whereas the contractor’s representative had no motive to lie about the
matter.
Same sex harassment was the subject of a Type I case in Hughes Aircraft
Company v. Electronic and Space Technicians Local 1553.67 The grievant denied
every allegation made by his co-workers. The arbitrator upheld the discharge
stating, “If the grievant is to be believed, the three employees must have gone to
great lengths and efforts to coordinate their detailed testimonies regarding the
Grievant’s behavior.”68 The arbitrator also noted that a union witness and a
manager’s notes both corroborated the “detailed, specific and consistent” testimony
of the three complaining employees.69 She concluded that “the Grievant’s denial of
every one of these incidents testified to by other witnesses is, in light of all these
considerations, simply not credible.”70
Arbitrators deciding Type II cases tend to rely on more subtle elements of just
cause in determining whether a grievance should be sustained or denied. For
example, when the grievant did not testify at the hearing, the arbitrator drew a
negative inference in Safeway, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union
Local 588.71 A male food clerk was discharged for sexually harassing female
employees; such conduct including improper touching and inappropriate comments.
The arbitrator upheld the discharge stating that the evidence of the grievant’s actions,
as presented by the female employees and other witnesses, was unrebutted and
therefore must be accepted as fact.
Extensive analysis of the evidentiary record was not the primary concern of the
arbitrator in Grievant v. City of Austin,72 because “[t]he record plainly demonstrates
that this has already been established.”73 A male police lieutenant was suspended
and demoted for sexual harassment of, and immoral conduct toward, a female police
dispatcher. These officers had been dating but the dispatcher sought to break off the
relationship. When the grievant did not comply, a meeting was held and the chief of
police gave the grievant a formal letter of warning, which was also placed in the
lieutenant’s personnel file. It was subsequently proven that he made calls to the
dispatcher’s home. The arbitrator concurred with the chief’s assessment that this
constituted “insubordination, in violation of Department Rule 60” because the
lieutenant has been “on notice that he was to refrain from having any further contact

67

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Electronic and Space Technicians Local 1553, 94-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 4798 (1993) (Bickner, Arb.).
68

Id. at 4804.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Safeway, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 588, 105 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 718 (1995) (Goldberg, Arb.).
72

Grievant v. City of Austin, 95-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3395 (1995) (Fogelberg).

73

Id.
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with the dispatcher.”74 The thirty-day suspension was upheld, but the grievance was
sustained with respect to demotion.
C. Totality of Record
The totality of the record is an important consideration in determining whether
the discipline meted out is appropriate for a proven sexual harassment offense and
should, therefore, be sustained. This is especially pertinent in Type II cases.
Whether the grievant’s total record with the company exacerbates or mitigates the
complaint is unique to each case. For example, a grievant with an active record of
discipline for another unrelated offense(s) may be subject to the next level of
progressive discipline, up to and including discharge, even if this is the first sexual
harassment offense. Conversely, a discharge is the likely result for repeated
harassment offenses, especially if corrective action is of no avail. This is true even if
progressive discipline is not adhered to and/or other mitigating factors are in a
grievant’s favor. As in other just cause cases, disparate treatment and past practice
can also influence an arbitrator’s decision whether the discipline is appropriate for a
proven offense.
In GTE California Inc. v. Communication Workers,75 a grievant with years of
service with the company was terminated for creating a hostile work environment.
He had previously been given two five-day suspensions, one for verbal abuse and
one for sexual harassment. The grievant’s earlier comments included anti-Filipino,
anti-white, anti-female, and age discriminatory remarks. He continued to make
hostile and offensive comments to fellow employees, but he did not make any clearly
discriminatory or sexually hostile comments. The arbitrator concluded “[i]t is clear
that any of these comments alone made by the grievant appear relatively harmless,
however, where the pattern is at a level where employees go out of their way to
avoid him, or dread coming to work, a serious problem exists that cannot be
ignored.”76 The arbitrator also considered that the company had a duty to provide an
harassment free workplace and that the grievant was aware of the policy but
“continued to create a hostile environment” by his comments.77 The arbitrator
considered the grievant’s prior discipline, together with his unabated behavior, and
upheld the discharge.
Recidivism and notice were issues in City of Las Vegas v. Las Vegas City
Employees Association.78 The city discharged a male foreman who brushed his body
against a female employee three times in one month and, on another occasion,
hugged and kissed her as a ‘thank you’ for driving him home. The foreman had
received a written reprimand for earlier harassing conduct and had been required to
attend sexual harassment classes. In upholding the discharge, the arbitrator found

74

Id. at 3398.

75
GTE California Inc. v. Communication Workers, 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 343 (1994)
(Grabuskie, Arb.).
76

Id. at 350.

77

Id.

78

City of Las Vegas v. Las Vegas City Employees Assoc., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 654
(1996) (Bergeson, Arb.).
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these actions to constitute ample notice to the grievant of the impropriety of his
conduct.
As illustrated by Pacific Bell v. Communication Workers,79 arbitrators tend to
treat repeat sexual harassment following counseling in the same manner as drug and
alcohol abuse cases. When recidivism occurs after counseling, the stage is set for
further discipline, usually discharge. Most arbitrators uphold the discharge in these
instances.
As illustrated by Pepsi Cola Bottling,80 these principles apply equally in cases
where an employee harasses customers. In this case, a uniformed driver, prior to
being terminated, had been warned several times, suspended twice, and had been
issued a final warning about making sexual comments to and/or having physical
contact with customers or employees of customers. Evidence was “abundant that
Grievant established a pattern of engaging in inappropriate conduct of a sexual
nature while performing his job.”81 In upholding the discharge, the arbitrator said
“His [the grievant’s] conduct was more egregious since it involved customers of the
Company,” and the incident which gave rise to his discharge “was the last straw.”82
This case is even more significant because it addresses whether quid pro quo
harassment can be found in circumstances involving customers. This arbitrator said,
“The evidence shows that Grievant offered product to a couple of employees of
customers for favors. These offers were declined and no product ever changed
hands. I agree with the Union that this allegation falls short of just cause for
discharge.”83
An important ‘mixed’ case involving prior discipline for lateness and failure to
perform assigned duties by a uniformed driver, and for sexual harassment of a
company customer’s female employee was cause for discharge according to the
arbitrator in Golden States Foods Corporation v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local No. 104.84 With respect to both matters, the arbitrator took
judicious note that none of the previous discipline was grieved and, thus, was not at
issue in the instant case. Based upon the grievant’s prior discipline, the totality of
the record, and his self-serving testimony, the arbitrator concluded that the grievant
“knew or should have known” what behavior was expected of him not only at the
worksite but equally in terms of the standards expected of him in dealing with
customer employees. She further noted that the grievant had bid on a route from
which he had been removed because of previous harassment complaints.
Notwithstanding the fact that management had restored grievant to the route, the
arbitrator chastised the grievant for even bidding on the route.

79

Pacific Bell v. Communication Workers, 98-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH), 5795 (1997)
(Oestreich, Arb.).
80

Pepsi Cola Bottling, 97-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 993 (1997) (Thornell, Arb.).
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Id. at 994.

82

Id.
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Id.

84

Golden States Foods Corp. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 104, 97-2 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 4412 (1997) (Rivera, Arb.).
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From our analysis of Iowa (Department of Transportation) v. American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Iowa Council,85 we see that
arbitrators appear to give considerable weight to disparate treatment in sexual
harassment cases. Here, the grievant had made sexual comments, told jokes of a
sexual nature, and made sexual innuendoes to female co-workers. The allegations
were supported by credible testimony and the grievant was issued a ten-day
suspension. Another male employee participated in the same behavior but received a
written reprimand. The arbitrator reduced the grievant’s suspension to a written
reprimand, stating that the company failed to apply its rules, orders, and penalties
evenhandedly.
Sometimes it appears that arbitrators stretch the limits of Type II analysis in
deciding sexual harassment cases where disparate treatment is concerned. A case in
point is Metropolitan Transit Commission v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local
1005.86 The only female employee in the shop had been subjected to harassment for
five years and was touched on the breast by a male co-worker. As a result of an
EEOC investigation, the male co-worker and four other male employees were
discharged. A total of thirteen disciplinary actions were taken against men in the
shop due to their harassment of the complainant. The arbitrator was persuaded that
the grievant committed the harassment alleged, but reinstated him without backpay
because it was shown that a foreman received no discipline for similarly sexually
harassing the victim. The arbitrator stated, “Zero tolerance for sexual touching is a
commendable policy to follow, however, it is imperative that employees know this is
the policy when it discovers management acting contrary to it. Consequently, while
the Grievant’s long service to the Employer and his prior record of no discipline
would not normally be considered sufficient to mitigate the discipline by the
Employer for his behavior, it is considered under these circumstances and
determined that the discipline imposed should be something less than discharge.”87
This is a significant decision because it suggests that, like alcohol and drug testing
applied only to bargaining unit members, the discipline may be reduced if the union
can prove that management, or other employees, also engaged in the type of behavior
that led to the complaint. This is especially true where mitigating circumstances are
found.
Such circumstances were found by the arbitrator in Simkins Industries Inc. v.
United Paperworkers International Union Local 214.88 In this case a male leadman
was discharged by the company for sexually harassing female employees. Five
female employees alleged that the grievant harassed them, asserting also that he had
influence with management. The union challenged the discharge, contending that
the company treated supervisors who committed harassment more leniently than the
grievant. The arbitrator disagreed, finding that the company dealt with management
personnel involved in a fairly rigorous and fair fashion.
85

Iowa (Department of Transportation) v. American Fed. of State, County and Mun.
Employees, Iowa Council, 94-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 5227 (1993) (Clark, Arb.).
86

Metropolitan Transit Comm’n v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1005, 106 Lab. Arb.
360 (1996) (Imes, Arb.).
87

Id. at 364.

88

Simkins Indus. Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union Local 214, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
551 (1996) (Fullmer, Arb.).
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Arbitral consideration of the totality of the record can include consideration of
past practice with varying results. For example, in United Transportation Union
Local No. 23 v. Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District,89 a male employee was
suspended for ten-days because his remarks to a female supervisor created a hostile
environment. The grievant took issue with his supervisor’s report of his on-the-job
vehicular accident by uttering offensive and obscene remarks to her. The union
contended that since the supervisor declined to file a sexual harassment complaint,
past practice supported a finding that no discipline should have been given. The
arbitrator found that no past practice existed and upheld the grievant’s discipline.
The case Nebraska Department of Correctional Services v. Nebraska Association
of Public Employees, AFSCME Local 61,90 produced a different result based upon
past practice. Here the state terminated a male mental health counselor for failing to
report an incident of sexual harassment when he was an on-site supervisor. Part of
the union’s attack on this penalty charged that all employees who harassed a fellow
employee had not been discharged. The union also argued that the counselor’s
failure to report the incident did not warrant more severe discipline than the harasser
received. The arbitrator agreed and reduced the discipline to a six-month
disciplinary probation stating, “it is difficult to find that a single failure to report an
incident of sexual harassment warrants more severe discipline than some instances of
actual harassment.”91 She also noted that the grievant had no prior record of
discipline and that the degree of discipline imposed was not consistent with the
principles of progressive discipline.
D. Other Pertinent Considerations
1. Off Duty/Off Premises Conduct
Sexual harassment that occurs off duty and/or off premises has been a particular
challenge to the parties and to arbitrators. In discipline cases, most arbitrators
require the employer to establish a nexus between the behavior at issue and the
company’s interests. The difficulty in establishing the requisite nexus between
conduct and interest is reflected in the arbitral decisions made in sexual harassment
cases.
In Superior Coffee and Foods and Wholesale Delivery Drivers Local 848,92 a
Type I case involving egregious sexual harassment, a male salesperson was
discharged for sexually harassing two female employees while off duty. The
conduct occurred at a company sponsored social event two hundred miles from the
company’s offices. The arbitrator upheld the discipline stating, “[s]exual harassment
at a Company-sponsored event like the . . . conference, would be work related.”93
89
United Transportation Union Local No. 23 v. Santa Cruz Metro. Transit Dist., 94-2 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 5192 (1994) (Pool, Arb.).
90
Nebraska Dep’t of Correctional Servs. v. Nebraska Assoc. of Pub. Employees, AFSCME
Local 61, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 910 (1996) (Imes, Arb.).
91

Id. at 916.

92

Superior Coffee and Foods v. Wholesale Delivery Drivers Local 848, 103 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 609 (1994) (Alleywe, Arb.).
93

Id. at 612.
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The arbitrator also rejected efforts to have the penalty reduced because the grievant
was drunk, stating: “Nor am I impressed with the rationale of the Union’s cited case,
AFG Industries, that lack of employer supervision over a drunken sexual harasser
can alone void a discharge for sexual harassment. My reliance on it would be
misplaced, I believe, because it fails to hold the offending employee accountable for
his own misconduct. Drunk sexual harassers and drunk drivers are equally
accountable for the consequences of their conduct. Were it otherwise, an employee
desiring to sexually harass another employee, and aware that to harass while sober
would result in discharge, could drink 10 to 15 beers, as grievant here admitted
doing, harass the employee and rely on drunkenness as a bar to discharge.”94
Conversely, in City of Toronto v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Steuben Lodge
No. 1,95 a Type II case, the arbitrator overturned the discharge of a male police
officer that “consorted” with a female civilian. The officer had been ordered by his
superiors not to see the woman, but had ignored the order. The officer was found in
a state of undress at the woman’s house. He was terminated for disobeying a direct
order, inference in an official investigation, obstructing official business, and
harassment. The arbitrator reinstated the officer, in part, because he was off duty
when he was with the civilian. The arbitrator noted that the collective bargaining
agreement barred the city from disciplining officers for off-duty conduct, except for
serious crimes. The arbitrator concluded the officer’s actions failed to rise to the
level of a serious crime, and thus, was beyond the reach of the city’s disciplinary
jurisdiction.
Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers
Local 746,96 also addressed the issue of off duty conduct. In this case, the company
discharged a male employee for sexually harassing a female co-worker by
telephoning her at home and making ‘kissing sounds’ over a period of three months.
The victim, with the assistance of the Sheriff’s department, eventually discovered the
identify of the person making the calls. She reported this to the company and the
grievant was discharged. The company based its defense on the Meritor and Harris
cases, as well as on arbitral precedent. Analogous to the Paula Jones case, the
arbitrator concluded that this off duty conduct did not measure up to the generally
recognized standards for creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working
environment because there was no showing that the victim’s work performance was
harmed by the grievant’s conduct. He sustained the grievance and reinstated the
grievant with full seniority and benefits, but without backpay.
A contrasting decision is represented by Michigan Department of Transportation
v. United Technical Employees Association.97 A male employee was suspended for
three days for writing offensive allusions to the upper torso of a female instructor on
an off premises seminar evaluation form. The union protested the discipline, noting
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that the instructor was not a state employee, but rather was an independent contractor
and, thus, was not subject to the sexual harassment policy. The arbitrator considered
Meritor and Harris in deciding the isolated remark constituted “verbal harassment”,
but was not severe enough to create a hostile work environment under the law. He
also found that “With or without a specifically applicable work rule, there is no
unfairness” to the grievant, but ruled that progressive discipline should apply so the
three-day suspension was reduced to a letter of warning.98
It should also be noted that disciplinary action regarding off duty/off premises
conduct may be constrained by external law, i.e., constitutional or statutory rights.
For example, the State of New York has legislation that protects various types of
conduct that employees engage in while off duty. Public employers may also face
constitutional restraints.
2. Estoppel
The determination of another administrative agency usually will not be honored
in an arbitration proceeding to determine whether just cause existed for discipline
based upon allegations of sexual harassment. This is because the issue before the
agency may not be the same and/or the legal standards, underlying law, and burden
of proof are often different than in arbitration. Moreover, an arbitrator is empowered
to decide the case pursuant to the contract, not administrative law. These are the
same principles that apply in other just cause cases where an effort is made by either
party to introduce evidence from a worker’s compensation or unemployment
compensation proceeding.
Potlach Corporation v. United Paperworkers International Local 1532,99 a Type
I case, illustrates these points. The company discharged a long service employee for
sexual harassment of several female co-workers. The grievant filed for and was
subsequently awarded unemployment compensation. At the arbitration hearing, the
union argued that the unemployment agency ruling supported a finding that the
company did not have just cause to terminate the grievant. The arbitrator upheld the
discharge stating “As the arbitrator does not have the authority to interpret Arkansas
unemployment law, the Arkansas Employment Security Department does not have
the authority to interpret the collective bargaining agreement unless agreed to by the
parties.”100
3. Societal Perceptions
Over the last two decades, as the courts have struggled to define the concept of
sexual harassment, societal perceptions of what constitutes such harassment have
changed a great deal. Both courts and arbitrators have found navigating the waters of
dispute resolution in sexual harassment cases a challenging task. As is evident
elsewhere in this article, arbitral perceptions of sexual harassment have mirrored the
crosscurrents.
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In International Mill Service v. United States Steelworkers, District 34,101 a Type
I case, a male employee was discharged because he repeatedly sexually harassed a
female co-worker by using “sexually suggestive language” and engaged in “sexually
explicit behavior.” At the arbitration hearing the grievant claimed he was only
“teasing and playing” and treated the entire situation as a “big joke.” The arbitrator
upheld the termination finding that “sexual jokes, posters, propositions, and the like
that were loosely tolerated as a workplace norm 20 years ago are unacceptable and
illegal today.”102
In another type I case, Indiana Gas Company, Inc. v. International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers Local 1392,103 a male service technician was suspended for
inappropriate remarks and for the unsolicited touching of a female teenage customer
during a service call. The technician had also made improper remarks to female
employees on previous occasions. A critical feature of the hearing was that the
teenager was not presented to testify, causing the union to claim that the company’s
case was built on hearsay and arguing its disadvantage because she was not available
for cross-examination. The arbitrator responded to the absence of the teenager by
noting that management “had a very high hurdle to jump over to prove their case” in
the teenager’s absence.104 Addressing the merits of the case, the arbitrator said that
“in recent years, people’s sensivity to what is said to or about them has increased
greatly” and that “People are more likely to take offense to remarks, and are more
likely to complain about what they perceive to be offensive behavior.”105 The
arbitrator then tied these views to the nature of the company’s business by stating
that “all employees, and in particular those who come into contact with customers,
must be very careful about how they interact with customers, and/or the public at
large while they are representing the Company.”106 The grievance was denied.
Even same sex harassment was found to be unacceptable in a third example of a
Type I case. In City of Fort Worth v. Individual Grievant,107 a male supervisor was
terminated because he approached a male trainee from behind, put his hands in the
trainee’s front pants pockets, pulled him close, and held him in that position for 10 to
15 seconds. The grievant’s defense was that he was merely “goosing” the victim,
that he was merely engaging in “horse play”, and that he was merely doing the same
things that were done to him when he was a trainee twenty-two years ago. Integral
to the arbitrator’s ruling was a city policy that stated explicitly that “No employee,
either male or female, shall be subjected to unsolicited and unwelcome sexual
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overtures or conduct, either verbal or physical.”108 The arbitrator recognized that
horseplay can “be considered consensual on occasions,” but in order for that
interpretation to apply “the victim of the horseplay must have laid a predicate prior
to the action having been taken that he welcomed, invited or accepted the action
directed towards him.”109
The arbitrator also had to grapple with a claim of disparate treatment because
another supervisor had received a three-day suspension two years ago for similar
conduct. The matter of disparate treatment was overcome because the city was able
to demonstrate to the arbitrator’s satisfaction that the previous incident created a
“water shed,” the result of which was a thorough review of “policy regarding the
elimination of hostile work environment” and sensitivity training for all
employees.110 The incident complained of occurred after these things had occurred.
In dismissing the grievance, the arbitrator concluded that the grievant’s conduct, “. . .
cannot be excused because it was done to the Appellant when he was a Trainee, or
that others did the same or [a] similar thing twenty-two years ago. Particularly so
when the Appellant is charged with carrying out the prevention of sexual harassment
for the City and had undergone sensitivity training merely eight months previously.
The Victim was defenseless. As a practical matter a Trainee is not in a position to
make an assertion against an officer during his/her training period where retention in
the program or failing the program depends on subjective evaluation.”111
Type II cases present a very different picture of the influence of societal
perception on arbitral decision-making. In Safeway, Inc. v. United Food and
Commercial Workers Union Local 870,112 a male employee told dirty jokes which
offended two female employees. Evidence was presented that these jokes were
“enjoyed or shrugged off” by most employees, but offended a few young female
employees. The arbitrator cited the Meritor and Hensen decisions in finding that the
grievant created a hostile work environment, especially in view of the company’s
published policy prohibiting sexual harassment. He also noted that the grievant was
an outstanding employee for over twenty years, and had never been disciplined or
warned about his jokes. Based upon arbitral precedent, the arbitrator concluded that
in cases where the grievant did not touch the employee or engage in similar offensive
conduct, but rather the harassment was limited to verbiage, termination was not the
appropriate penalty. He also took note that the grievant testified that he had learned
his lesson and that there had been a large outpouring of indignation over the
grievant’s termination from male and female co-workers, retired management, and
customers. The termination was reduced to a suspension based upon the grievant’s
contrition and the appearance that there was a reasonable expectation of
rehabilitation from this corrective action.
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The same result obtained in another Type II case involving Safeway, Inc. v.
United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 7.113 In this instance a male
supermarket employee, with over eight years of service to the company, was
discharged for sexual harassment. The employee had made various offensive
comments to female employees in what he claimed was a joking manner. A month
before the latest incident, the grievant had been suspended for five days for similar
conduct. Until the suspension, the grievant had not been disciplined during his eightyear tenure for making similar “joking” comments. The arbitrator reduced the
termination to a suspension because he was persuaded that the grievant recognized
the seriousness of his offense and appeared to be capable of rehabilitation.
According to the arbitrator, “The grievant must understand that he is a dinosaur in
the modern workplace, and like a dinosaur (i.e., a sexual harasser), he will either
change or be extinct in the near future.”114
E. Advice to Advocates
The information presented thus far has given you a framework for understanding
key differences between Type I and Type II sexual harassment cases, shown how
arbitral decisions parallel decision-making by the courts, and provided an in-depth
look at how arbitrators decided such cases. As an advocate, it is your responsibility
to make appropriate use of information like this when you represent either a union or
an employer in a sexual harassment case. It is important to recognize that the
advocate’s job begins well before a case ever reaches the hearing stage. The way
you use such information during the preparation phase can have a major impact on
the results you achieve whether in arbitration or in settlement before arbitration. As
an advocate, you are, of course, under pressure from the party you serve to prevail if
a sexual harassment case goes to arbitration. To help you make the best use of our
analysis; we provide the following advice.
1. Selection of the Arbitrator
Parties to a collective bargaining agreement obtain arbitrators primarily in two
ways. They ask for a panel from either the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS) or the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or they build an
arbitrator(s) into their collective bargaining agreement.
In either instance
‘homework’ is important, but may not be dispositive. Obviously the first part of this
‘homework’ is to find out if the arbitrators on the FMCS/AAA list, or the arbitrators
suggested for inclusion in the agreement, have decided sexual harassment cases. The
way an arbitrator has decided other types of cases may not necessarily be indicative
of his/her reasoning in harassment cases. As illustrated by the foregoing analysis,
perception, in addition to the facts, policy, and/or law, plays a role in the way
arbitrators regard the misconduct alleged. If the answer is ‘yes’ then what you will
want to examine carefully is the arbitrator’s reasoning, remembering that he/she can
only decide based upon the evidence presented. Resist the temptation simply to look
at an arbitrator’s win-lose record because this is the least reliable predictor of
decision-making in any type of case. With respect to arbitrators whom the parties
113
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build into their collective bargaining agreements, it is evident that in so doing most
parties do not even consider sexual harassment decision-making as a factor. It is
worthwhile for parties to consider not only the traditional factors they have relied
upon in building arbitrators into their agreement, but also this element of workplace
behavior.
Reviewing arbitral awards is not always possible since the vast preponderance of
awards is not published. For example, NAA arbitrators cannot submit any award for
publication without the permission of both parties, and even when permission is
obtained, both BNA and CCH make the final decision about which awards they will
publish. Notwithstanding this limitation, advocates should always include a search
for a published award in the preparation phase. They also need to utilize this
information in a meaningful way by examining the arbitrator’s reasoning.
A final note. As an advocate, you must be aware that men, historically and
contemporaneously, have decided a preponderance of sexual harassment cases. This
is understandable because men have and still dominate the neutral arbitration
profession. As illustrated by the cases discussed in the foregoing analysis, this is no
evidence that male arbitrators are more likely than female arbitrators to address the
issue with detachment. An obvious fact is that sexual harassment cases, including
same sex harassment, involve alleged misconduct by a male. In selecting arbitrators
from either FMCS/AAA list or for inclusion in their agreement, wise advocates will
recognize that the gender of the arbitrator, like his/her win-lose record is of de minis
importance.
2. Opening Statement
The opening statement creates a road map for the arbitrator to follow in picking
his/her way through the facts, evidence, and arguments. It is unwise to clutter this
map with extraneous information, hyperbole, and sarcasm. These can confuse the
arbitrator or cause him/her to turn off so their attention is not focused when an
advocate does make an important point. It is incumbent upon advocates to carefully
prepare a clear, concise, logical statement of the case.
When the grievant’s advocate believes the client has strong arguments under the
seven tests of just cause, the advocate should try to have the arbitrator decide
separately the issues of culpability and appropriate penalty, i.e., if the conduct is
proven, then the penalty was excessive for the offense. In other cases, an advocate
must recognize when there is little to argue regarding the conduct at issue and focus
the arbitrator’s attention on defects in the administration of the discipline, i.e.,
investigation, disparate treatment, past practice, etc.
An advocate for the employer first needs to understand whether the conduct
alleged falls under the Type I or the Type II category. If it can be shown that the
conduct is clearly egregious, then it is easier to convince an arbitrator that severe
discipline is warranted. In Type II cases an employer’s advocate must pay more
attention to justifying the penalty, demonstrating why it is appropriate for the offense
proven, and surgically disposing of any possible challenges based upon disparate
treatment, past practice, etc.
3. Arguing External Law
The external law of sexual harassment found in court decisions can be of
assistance to advocates. For example, an advocate for the grievant may be able to
find case law that contains a fact pattern similar to the allegations made by the
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employer. The court may have held that such conduct was not severe or pervasive or
did not alter the terms and conditions of the victim’s employment. Although the
standards of analysis for the law of the shop may differ from the external law, the use
of sympathetic case law may be persuasive enough to change an arbitrator’s
perspective of the conduct and, thus, of the appropriate penalty for same. This is
especially true if the employer’s sexual harassment policy merely restates the
external law. Arbitrator should be sympathetic to the argument that if the conduct at
issue was not found to be sexual harassment by a court, then similar conduct under
parallel policy should not be found to be sexual harassment. Parallel policy opens
the door for the advocate to argue severity and pervasiveness, and most important, to
argue that there is no evidence that the victim’s terms and conditions of employment
were in any way affected by the harassment at issue.115
4. Advantages of Remorse and of Telling the Truth
In cases where the grievant is clearly culpable and even the best prepared and
most eloquent advocate cannot stem the tide, it is worthwhile to carefully consider
preparing the grievant to show remorse, apologize, and promise that the conduct will
not happen again. These can help convince an arbitrator that there is a reasonable
expectation of rehabilitation and, thus, to opting for something less than discharge as
appropriate penalty. Advocates should first make the employer establish its prima
facie case by engaging in rigorous cross-examination executed in a way calculated
not to victimize the accuser or antagonize the arbitrator. If the employer’s case holds
firm, then the advocate should be ready to consider remorse and apology when the
grievant testifies. A remorseful grievant who has admitted the essential facts can
mitigate against the penalty imposed if the employer appears to be vindictive, to
have embellished the facts, failed to investigate properly, etc.
It does not take extensive research to discover the number of instances where the
testimony of the alleged harasser makes the case worse, thus ensuring that the
discipline will be upheld. Some arbitrators apply the “you lie, you die” credibility
test and may be predisposed to give less weight to the seven tests of just cause if the
grievant is sworn to tell the truth, and then obviously lies in testimony.
5. Do Not Testify if the Employer Fails to Provide Live Witness Testimony
(i.e., Don’t Fight Ghosts)
When the alleged victim will not testify,116 the first thing an advocate should do is
research with the goal of selecting an arbitrator who will not take hearsay testimony
and/or allow an affidavit that cannot be cross-examined. This advice should be taken
very seriously because this type of case can be won or lost by the selection of the
arbitrator.
If an arbitrator admits hearsay, which is permissible in arbitration, it is important
for advocates to effectively and appropriately use objections to forestall admission of
secondary and tertiary hearsay. Many arbitrators will sustain such an objection if it
115
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is made, but will not insert themselves if the advocate is silent. In the latter case, an
advocate loses control over what goes into the record and frees the arbitrator to place
whatever weight he/she deems appropriate on secondary and tertiary hearsay in
fashioning an award.
When an arbitrator admits hearsay and/or affidavits, it is imperative that an
advocate does everything reasonable to prevent the grievant from providing the
corroborating testimony.117 If there are no other witnesses, then an advocate has to
make a very important judgment call based upon his/her ‘read’ of the arbitrator at the
hearing and the research done at the time of selection. In general, an advocate is
probably in a better position if he/she argues that the employer has failed to provide
direct evidence of the alleged offense, deprived the grievant of the due process right
to cross-examine the accuser, and rest the case without calling the grievant. The one
exception is when the advocate is convinced that the grievant did not engage in the
conduct at issue and will easily exculpate him/herself by testifying. As experienced
advocates know, this is seldom the case. If the employer does call corroborating
witnesses, an advocate should actively question why the victim could not testify and
hammer this point home in the closing arguments. Unless an employer can produce
legitimate evidence that the victim was threatened, subjected to other substantial
coercion, or minority status really justified failure to testify, many arbitrators tend to
view employer arguments for not producing the victim as insincere.
6. Effective Use of Requests for Information
The grievant’s advocate should make detailed information requests for all
affidavits, correspondence, documents, and all other information that relates to the
grievant’s discipline and to any other employee, management or union, who has been
disciplined for the same/or similar offense.118 While this is a legitimate endeavor,
sometimes advocates use this as a ‘fishing expedition.’ Such activity is strongly
discouraged and can be used by an employer to challenge the credibility of your
request(s) and, potentially your case. However, when a legitimate request for
information is denied, there is recourse in terms of filing an unfair labor practice
charge and/or making this known to the arbitrator at the outset of the hearing.
Advocates must be dutiful in informing the arbitrator of such denial at the outset of
the case before testimony and evidence is presented. Most arbitrators will not allow
an employer to use information in support of its case that it has denied to the
grievant/union prior to the proceedings. More importantly, it is possible that a
negative inference may even be from such denial. If, for any reason, an arbitrator
admits evidence that you requested/haven’t seen before, then it is incumbent upon an
advocate to ask the arbitrator for time to read the information and, if appropriate, for
117
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a recess or continuation to prepare a response. Most arbitrators will grant this
request if the advocate makes it. If the advocate simply reacts with hostility, then
he/she goes forward at their own peril. However, many arbitrators will draw a
negative inference if an employer has withheld information legitimately requested.
Advocates also should not forget that they have the option, in the preparation phase,
to ask the arbitrator to subpoena information legitimately requested but denied by the
employer. Once again, this reinforces the importance of good preparation and
reinforces the link between preparation and the outcome of the case.
7. Keep Your Witnesses on the Team
A substantial amount of time often elapses between the issuance of discipline for
sexual harassment and an arbitration hearing. An effective advocate should stay in
regular touch with witnesses to make sure they stay on board and/or have not been
subjected to intimidation, and to find out if they have additional information not
reported initially, including recollection of other alleged witnesses. When a witness
is left out in the cold and suddenly receives a call to testify, the witness it not
prepared and recollections can fade or are blocked. Especially where the grievant
has been discharged, an on-going relationship with a witness(es) still on the job can
provide an important source of information that may be helpful to your case.
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